The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), whose authority is widely recognized by the international community, released the results of a series of public opinion surveys conducted from November 26 to December 13 on December 15. I believe these polls accurately reflect the true public opinion in Ukraine and are of great reference value. I have translated them and serve them to you as follows.

A. Nearly two-thirds are willing to endure a long war until a just peace is achieved. 63% of Ukrainians are willing to endure the war for as long as the government deems necessary, and another 1% said they are willing to endure for about a year. This is a slight increase from the September survey. Another 15% of respondents said six months or a few months, compared to 21% previously, while the number of those unable to answer increased from 13% to 21%.

B. Only a minority believe the war will end before the end of 2026. 14% of Ukrainians believe the war might end in the first half of 2026 (15% in September), 11% believe it will end in the second half of 2026 (12% previously), 9% expect the war to end in early 2026 (18% in the September survey), and 32% believe it will be 2027 or later (same as before). Others expressed ignorance or inability to predict.

C. Zelensky's approval rating remains above 60%. 61% of Ukrainians trust President Volodymyr Zelensky, and 32% distrust him. This is the same as the poll results released in early October. If you look at the following two questionnaires, readers will find that Ukrainians possess extremely high wisdom (more than 80% of Ukrainians have received higher education) — they do not fully agree with Zelensky, but in order to win this war, they do not approve of holding elections during wartime.

D. More than half of Ukrainians oppose wartime elections. 57% of Ukrainians said that elections should only be held after a final peace agreement is reached and the war has completely ended, compared to 63% in September; 9% support holding elections "now", compared to 11% in September; 25% support elections with a ceasefire and security guarantees, a figure that is trending upward, compared to 22% in September.

E. Nearly half of Ukrainians prefer new leaders to appear in post-war politics. 45% of Ukrainians do not want to see current President Zelensky or his predecessor and opposition leader Poroshenko continue in politics after the war. 32% believe Zelensky should remain in politics while opposing Poroshenko continuing to exert influence; 14% hold the opposite view, that is, Poroshenko's popularity is higher than Zelensky's. Only 9% expressed hope that both Zelensky and Poroshenko would remain in politics. 32% of respondents want to see Zelensky, Poroshenko, or both held criminally liable; within this 32% group, 5% support prosecuting both political figures, and the remaining 27% support taking action against one of them. Although 32% is a relatively high figure, it also means that 68% of respondents do not wish for, or believe there is insufficient evidence for, or do not support criminal proceedings against Zelensky or Poroshenko.

F. Three-quarters of Ukrainians oppose the US-Russia "Peace Plan." 75% of Ukrainians consider a peace plan involving withdrawal from Donbas and limiting the size of the Ukrainian army completely unacceptable; only 17% of Ukrainians are ready to accept the Russian version of peace. This remains the same as in September 2025. Meanwhile, 72% of Ukrainians are willing to support the peace plan proposed by Europe and Ukraine, and only 14% are firmly opposed.

G. Trust in the United States dives, nearly halving. Trust in the United States is at 21%, nearly half of the 41% in the December 2024 survey; distrust is at 48%, doubling from 24% in December 2024. The remaining 32% were undecided. However, a survey in May of this year showed that 90% of Ukrainians hold a positive view of Americans, distrusting only the US government.

H. Distrust in NATO slightly exceeds trust. 34% of respondents trust NATO, lower than 43% in December 2024; 41% distrust it, significantly higher than 25% in the same period last year. The remaining 25% were undecided.

I. Trust in the EU is far higher than distrust. 49% of respondents trust the European Union, and 23% distrust it; in December 2024, these figures were 46% and 19% respectively, meaning there has been almost no change. The remaining 27% chose "hard to say" or "unsure."

J. Over 90% of the public holds a negative attitude towards Russia. 91% of Ukrainians hold a negative attitude towards Russia, the same as the 2024 survey. When asked "How do you generally view Russians — residents of Russia?", only 8% of Ukrainians expressed a positive attitude, while 85% held a negative view, a result identical to 2024. The vast majority of Ukrainians in all regions — from 91% in the west to 73% in the east — view Russia negatively; the proportion of those holding a positive attitude did not exceed 14% in the east. A total of 82% of respondents (83% in the west, 84% in the center, 76% in the south, 78% in the east) believe that Russians living in Russia should not be allowed to enter Ukraine. From this, we can see that there are only about 10% of staunchly pro-Russian individuals in Ukraine.

K. Nearly 60% of Ukrainians believe Ukraine will be a prosperous EU member in ten years. The proportion of Ukrainians who believe the country will be prosperous and a member of the EU in ten years has risen from 43% last year to 56%. In successive surveys conducted from October 2022 to May 2025, Ukrainian optimism continued to decline. In May 2025, pessimistic views exceeded optimistic ones for the first time: 47% believed Ukraine would become a country with a damaged economy and massive population outflow in ten years, while 43% believed Ukraine would be a prosperous EU member. Recently, optimism has begun to rise again; as of early October, 56% of respondents are optimistic about Ukraine's future; the proportion of those believing Ukraine will be a devastated country with massive population outflow in ten years has dropped from 47% to 31%.

L. Views on leaders of many countries closely related to Ukraine are mostly negative. Only 24.4% of Ukrainians expressed trust in Trump, a sharp drop compared to 44.6% trust when Trump began his second term; 72.7% of Ukrainians expressed distrust. The new Polish President Nawrocki also has low trust among Ukrainians, with only 44% expressing trust in him. Slovak Prime Minister Fico's trust rating is 28.5%. Hungarian Prime Minister Orban's trust rating is only 12.4%. The three national leaders with the highest distrust ratings among Ukrainians are: Putin 98%, Lukashenko 93.8%, and Orban 83%.